• This summer’s Lake Erie algae bloom is almost certain to be the worst on record, warn the scientists who study the lake.

    via www.dispatch.com

    Here is what I said to a group of local environmental professionals about Lake Erie Harmful Algal Blooms last year:

    We’ve heard a lot today about solutions for high phosphorous loads in Lake Erie and the resulting harmful algal blooms.  As an environmental economist, I’m told my role in this discussion is to provide a balanced look at the potential costs of reducing phosphorous loadings into Lake Erie, the benefits of those reductions to society, and the burden of the costs of phosphorous reductions. 

    Some of you may be wondering, what is an environmental economist? An environmental economist is an economist who applies the science of economics to environmental issues.  I am not an environmentalist.  Don’t get me wrong, I care about the environment.  But I am realistic about the role that incentives, trade-offs, and profits play in finding solutions to environmental issues that lead to sustainable human well-being.   I recognize the reality that the economy and the natural environment are inextricably linked and attempting to separate the study of each creates a situation in which neither is sustainable.  Economic, social and environmental sustainability requires the realization that no single solution exists.

    So what then, from my perspective as an environmental economist, is the fundamental issue surrounding harmful algal blooms?  Excess nutrient loads into Lake Erie are the result of misalignment of incentives.  The profit incentives of the on-farm sector fail to fully capture the costs of nutrient application decisions to the non-agricultural sectors.  The cost-savings incentives of industrial and municipal sources of run-off fail to fully capture the downstream costs of urban run-off.  The consume-now incentive of today’s consumers fails to fully capture the cost of today’s decisions on future generations.

    None of these statements are judgments on the intent of individual farmers, or municipal decision makers or society today in making decisions that impose excess costs on others.  In fact, in my experience, most people want to do the right thing.  Farmers care about environmental issues.  Municipalities care about water quality.  Today’s generation cares about the future.  Yet when consumption and production decisions are made, reality differs from intent. 

    For example, when I drove here this morning, I gave no thought to the cost my car exhaust imposes on others.  I know that my exhaust contributes to increased atmospheric pollution.  I know that by driving I increase the likelihood of health issues for those with breathing issues.  I know that my driving contributes to long-term climate change.  Yet, other than being a genuinely nice person, I have no incentive to incorporate those external costs into my driving decisions.  The price of driving does not fully reflect the external costs.

    Prices are the economy’s rationing mechanism.  It is prices that drive economic decisions.  Prices provide signals.  It’s prices that serve as a market’s way of reflecting the value of something.  And if prices fail to fully reflect the current and future costs and benefits of production and consumption, markets will misallocate society’s scarce resources. 

    In political and social discussions we hear a lot of talk the need for less government regulation, the need for free markets.  In general I agree with free market advocates.  But in order for a market to do its job of allocating society’s scarce resources today and into the future, that market must capture ALL costs and benefits.  Otherwise a market is not truly a free market.

    In the case of the environment, we can think of the problem as one of the failure of markets to properly price the services the environment supplies.  In effect, the environment is treated as a free input in production and consumption.  It is only natural that if something is free we will use more than we would if it is priced at its true value.  If gas were free, I would use a lot more of it.  Because the cost of environmental degradation is not captured in markets, we use more of it than we would otherwise.  It might be tempting then to conclude that markets are the problem.  I agree to a certain extent.  Markets are failing to properly account for costs and benefits.  But markets are also the solution. 

    To solve the harmful algal bloom problem, we need to find ways to better capture the external costs of using nitrogen and phosphorous in the markets in which they are used—and then allow the resulting incentives work to solve the problem.  To do so, we can focus on the quantity of phosphorous, or we can focus on the price.  Quantity restrictions are effective if monitored effectively, but effective monitoring is difficult.  Effective quantity restrictions will reflect in market prices.  However, ill-designed quantity restrictions can result in regulatory costs that are higher than needed. 

    Regulating prices, on the other hand, allow the users to make decisions that reduce their own costs.  By allowing the freedom to choose how to adapt to higher prices, price-based policies can achieve the same outcomes as quantity restrictions at lower cost. 

    However, many of the price-based solutions have a negative reputation:  taxes, subsidies, cap and trade, user fees.  But as an environmental economist, I recognize that solutions that build environmental costs into market decisions allow individuals to make the decisions that are in their own best interest. The result is what’s best for society.

    Unfortunately, we are talking about a problem of magnitude that hoping people will do the right thing is not an option.  While voluntary programs are attractive politically, achieving a 40% reduction in Lake Erie phosphorous loadings, if that is indeed the goal, is going to require more than reliance on goodwill.  Real, sustainable, solutions are going to require a recognition that prices need to capture the full social costs of nitrogen and phosphorous use.  Anything short of that will lead right back here next year, hoping the problem solves itself. [emphasis added]

    Here's more from the Dispatch article:

    Those scientists have recommended cutting the amount of phosphorus that reaches Lake Erie by 40 percent from 2008 levels in order to reduce algae.

    To do that, farmers in will have to change the way they operate. Scientists say manure and fertilizers that wash from farm fields are responsible for a large portion of the phosphorus that gets into the lake.

    Ohio State and other universities are studying ways farmers can keep phosphorus out of the Lake Erie watershed.

    Chris Winslow, interim director at Stone Lab and Ohio Sea Grant, said soil testing could help.

    If farmers know how much phosphorus already exists in their soil, he said, they won’t need to add more than the soil needs to grow crops.

    The state could also expand wetlands around the rivers and streams that feed Lake Erie. And farmers could install special “two-stage ditches” that would filter phosphorus from runoff before it reaches the watersheds.

    So, to answer my own rhetorical title question. 

    Nope.

  • Call for papers:

    The Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis (SBCA) is now accepting abstracts for participation in our 2016 annual conference on Improving the Theory and Practice of Benefit-Cost Analysis. We define BCA broadly, including cost-effectiveness analysis, risk-benefit analysis, applied welfare economics, damage assessment and other methods. Applications in any public policy area are encouraged.

    Submissions may address the link between theory and practice, the methods used to estimate particular types of costs or benefits, the application of BCA to specific case studies, the role of BCA in decision making, or any other relevant topic. We welcome submissions from scholars, practitioners, and others working in academia, nonprofits, business and government around the world.

    Abstracts must be between 200 to 300 words in length and clearly describe the research. You may submit an abstract for an individual presentation or organize a panel. The panel may involve four presentations or three presentations with one or two discussants, or be structured as a roundtable discussion. Panel proposals must include a description of the overall focus of the panel as well as a 200 to 300-word abstract for each presentation.

    The Program Committee reserves the right to select only a subset of the panel abstracts for presentation or to reorganize the panels if needed. Submissions are limited to one abstract per presenter, although you may be listed as co-author on an unlimited number of other presentations. You may submit two abstracts only if one is for an individual presentation and the second is part of an organized panel; the two abstracts must address substantially different areas of research.

    Submission of an abstract for an individual presentation or panel is viewed as a firm commitment to participate in the conference if accepted. Entries received after October 16, 2015 are not guaranteed consideration by the program committee.

    via benefitcostanalysis.org

  • From the inbox:

    Thank you for your contribution of $8 on 8/21/2015 to the Carbon Neutral Commuter program.

    100% of your contribution will be used to purchase carbon offsets.

    For complete information about the program and how contributions are being spent, please visit Carbon Neutral Commuter!

    And I feel fine.

  • //platform.twitter.com/widgets.js

    And we went back and forth a bit from there. Recognizing that the twitter is a lousy way to communicate, David went to the blog:

    One week ago, I tweeted that the Pope (!) should push for carbon taxes instead of cap and trade. In response, John Whitehead (a busy environmental economist and blogger) said "why taxes?" The following tweet exchanges were neither satisfactory nor complete, so here's a post.

    Before I get into David's post it might be useful to review where I stand on the issue. In terms of addressing climate change I think that a carbon tax and cap-and-trade are 1a and 1b policies. Given that this is almost a tie, command and control policies are a distance third. As the title suggests, my perception is that many economists feel that they need to choose their favorite policy instrument and then denigrate the other. I don't understand this sort of behavior. It is like preferring chocolate to vanilla, preferring vanilla to nothing and then arguing how much better chocolate is to vanilla. You sir, will get nothing and like it!

    A long time ago I did the principles level analysis of carbon tax vs cap-and-trade and found that there is little to distinguish the two. Both can achieve the efficient level of emissions reduction. Both can generate the same amount of revenue. Both provide incentives for dynamic efficiency (i.e., firms have an incentive to cut abatement costs). There is little to distinguish between the economic outcomes. 

    Now, on to the David's post. After a review of both policies David provides three reasons to prefer carbon taxes:

    Carbon taxes are:

    1. Easy to assess (charged at source/point of entry)
    2. Predictable and adjustable
    3. Sources of revenue to the national treasury (or refunds to citizens)

    Considering just the economics (which is what we as economists should be mostly doing), a carbon cap is also predictable and adjustable. Price floors and ceilings can be used to make the market price less uncertain. Cap-and-trade with auctioned permits (e.g., RGGI) can generate just as much revenue as a carbon tax. 

    Then David asks and answers:

    So why do so many politicians like cap and trade over carbon taxes? They can:

    1. Claim big reductions based on (imaginary) baselines that have been capped.
    2. Give permits to favored industries (attracting corruption).
    3. Say that industry is doing something without spending money.

    Carbon taxes are harder to manipulate or dodge.

    So, quickly we have moved away from economic theory and into politics (sigh). These three seem to flow from the assumption that a cap-and-trade policy will undoubtedly be characterized by the issuance a large number of too many free permits. The flip side is that a carbon tax is likely to be set too low. I could easily assert that carbon taxes are easy to manipulate or dodge. Politicians could give carbon tax breaks to favored industries (attracting corruption). Is there anything in the historical record to suggest otherwise? All of these are political problems and not problems with incentive-based policy, per se.

    Another Q&A with David:

    But what about driving international improvements in efficiency, etc? Well, I think that theoretical promise has failed due to (1) terrible accounting for permits (e.g., failure of the "clean development mechanism") as well as (2) lots of anger over sending money abroad to get few useful results.

    I guess the Kyoto Protocol had some problems, eh? My guess is that a carbon tax would not be immune from implementation problems (but I may be naive).

    And David's conclusion:

    Thus, I have doubled down in my support for carbon taxes (many prior posts) because they can be…

    • Imposed within nations
    • Used to fund national projects (or given back to citizens)
    • Increased when other countries put them into place
    • Easily integrated into business and personal decisions affecting emissions

    Except for the third bullet, which I don't understand, these are all so true. And yet, I'm doubling down in my support for cap-and-trade (along with a carbon tax) because they can be:

    • Imposed within nations
    • Auction revenue can be used to fund national projects (or given back to citizens)
    • Easily integrated into business and personal decisions affecting emissions

    I'm also doubling down on my assertion that economists are too quick to fall into the carbon tax vs cap-and-trade trap. I think that most of economists prefer either incentive-based policy to the command-and-control or no policy status quo. 

    Here is David's "bottom line":

    Let's get real. Carbon taxes can reduce emissions, cheaply ($0.40/gallon!), under real political constraints.

    I'm left thoroughly unconvinced that a carbon tax is so far superior on economic grounds that economists should strongly favor it. I'm also unconvinced that cap-and-trade is uniquely prone to implementation problems and uniquely ripe for corruption. My bottom line:

    Let's get real. Cap-and-trade can also reduce emissions, cheaply, under real political constraints.

    There are currently on-going policy experiments that provide evidence to support both bottom lines. 

  • America's Finest News Source:

    According to a new report from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, July was the hottest month since recordkeeping began in 1880, averaging 1.46 degrees hotter than the July average and beating the previous record-setting month by .14 degrees. What do you think?

    • “And if the world works together, we can make next July even hotter.”
      Mickey Copeland
      Statistics Compiler
    • “Everyone knows the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is always talking out of its ass.”
      Dustin Belair
      Lobster Importer
    • “As a nation, we’re doing a terrible job of manipulating statistics.”
      Nan Freeberg
      Contract Approver

    via www.theonion.com

  • From the inbox:

    Dear John C. Whitehead,

    Greetings!

    Considering your published research paper of ‟A Split-Sample Revealed and Stated Preference Demand Model to Examine Homogenous Subgroup Consumer Behavior Responses to Information and Food Safety Technology Treatments” in related areas of Finance & Economics, we are very interested in publishing your latest papers in the forthcoming issues of Journal of Finance and Economics.

    Journal of Finance and Economics (ISSN 2291-4951) is a peer-reviewed professional journal published by Science and Education Centre of North America, Canada. The latest open-access papers are available on our website http://www.todayscience.org/jfe.

    All of your original unpublished papers are welcome. Papers can be directly submitted online through our website or sent by email in MS word format.

    Hope to keep in touch by email and publish some papers for you. We would like to receive your CV if you are also interested in becoming a reviewer of our journals.

    It is appreciated if you could kindly share this information with your colleagues and associates.

    We look forward to hearing from you soon.

    Kind regards,

    Steven Manson, Journal of Finance and Economics

    Science and Education Centre of North America (SECNA)

    Email: jfe@todayscience.org

    This journal is not to be confused with the Review of Economics and Finance which likes the exact same paper!

  • Matt Kahn:

    Adam Nagourney appears to be an adherent of the ideas of the Club of Rome.  In his NY Times front page piece today, he worries that California cities that encourage growth are exacerbating the "water crisis" by increasing demand during a drought that is likely to persist. What is the fallacy in his logic?

    He implicitly assumes that policy reform will not take place in California.  Farmers consume roughly 80% of the state's water.  According to this article, farmers now pay $.0033 per gallon.   Yes, that's .3 cents per gallon.  Residential households such as myself pay .5 cents per gallon.  A gallon of water is a gallon of water. Suppose that the Water Authorities raised the price of water for farmers so that it equals the price that urbanites pay.  Or, allow the farmers to sell their water allocation to urbanites.  This 66% increase would incentivize the sector that consumes 80% of the water to be more efficient and to substitute away from water intensive agricultural output that yields a low market price.

    If the state's farming sector could figure out a way to reduce its water consumption by 25%, how many urbanites could move to California?  For a 66% price increase to induce a 25% consumption decline implies a price elasticity = -.38 which strikes me as quite plausible in the medium term and perhaps too inelastic.

    34.1 million acre-feet is used by California agriculture each year.  A 25% reduction in CA agriculture water consumption = roughly 8 million acre feet =  8 million *326,000  =  2.6 trillion gallons of water not used.

    Suppose that 10 million new people moved to California's cities (so this is a 25% increase in the state's population).  The 2.6 trillion/10 million =   260000 gallons per new person per year = 712 gallons per new person per day.

    See how we adapt by introducing market incentives to allocate scarce resources?  The challenge of adaptation is mainly political (not economics). Allow free markets to operate and the NY Times will have to find new doom and gloom headlines.

    via greeneconomics.blogspot.com

    I only have one quibble. The water market will never be a "free market" in the true sense of the word. A plea to the water authority (i.e., government) to price water more rationally is a plea for policy reform (the term Matt uses earlier) towards a better use of incentives. Free markets only exist when there is no government regulation of buyers and sellers, no taxes, no subsidies and no nothing. An efficient free market for water is a difficult thing to pull off since it is a common-pool resource. It is easier for the pizza market to operate efficiently since pizza is a private good. 

    I don't think adaption to climate change can be accomplished efficiently by government taking a hands off approach. You can't privatize much of the natural environment. 

    Matt also said this the other day:

    Terry Anderson's book Free Market Environmentalism played a key role in my early thinking about Coase and environmental economics.   For years, Terry was in charge of PERC and I greatly benefited from my first visit to PERC in Bozeman MT a few years ago.  Today, some very serious economists will be meeting at Stanford for a 1.5 day conference on the economics of climate change adaptation.  The broad themes of this PERC conference are listed here.

    Free Market Environmentalism played a key role in my early thinking about Coase and environmental economics too. My conclusion was that free market solutions wouldn't work. Call me an unserious (inserious?) economist. 

  • From the inbox:

    Dear Dr. John C. Whitehead,

    Your interesting published article "A Split-Sample Revealed and Stated Preference Demand Model to Examine Homogenous Subgroup Consumer Behavior Responses to Information and Food Safety Technology Treatments" drives me to call for new papers and honorary reviewer, on behalf of Review of Economics & Finance, which is an English journal in Toronto, Canada: https://ideas.repec.org/s/bap/journl.html

    In the past 12 months, Review of Economics & Finance is ranked 50 among top 2,000 peer journals worldwide (Ranked by RePEc): http://logec.repec.org/scripts/seriesstat.pf?topnum=2000;citems=on;bymin=10;mrange=No;fm=;lm=;seriestype=redif-article;.cgifields=citems;.cgifields=listall;.cgifields=mrange;sortby=12d

    This peer-reviewed quarterly is indexed by EconLit, American Economic Association (AEA), EBSCO, ProQuest, RePEc, National Bibliography of Canada, Library and Archives Canada, DOAJ, Ulrich, and so on.

    (1) If you want to submit a new paper, please submit it by Sept. 20th, 2015.
    Your paper will be published within 3-5 months from the date of submission, provided it is accepted for publication after refereeing. Two hard copies are free for you after publication.

    (2) If you want to apply for an honorary reviewer, please kindly find the attached form and fill it out, then send it back.

    Thank you for your consideration. Just contact us directly at ref@bapress.ca or journalREF@gmail.com
    Have a rewarding month!
    Sincerely,
    ********************************************
    H. Carlson
    PhD. in Economics;Editor,Review of Economics & Finance
    Tel: +1-647-476-3762 ext.733  Fax: +1-647-476-3762 ext. 329
    Web: www.bapress.ca  Page: www.bapress.ca/ref-lastestissue.php

    I had never heard of Review of Economics & (not and) Finance or BA Press so I assumed they were a potential, possible, or probable predatory scholarly open-access journal and publisher. But, I like RePEc's journals rankings and hoped that the PPPP journals haven't found a way to scam RePEc. It turns out that the top 50 link above is for file downloads and not the best way to rank a journal (AER is #99, JEEM is #536). The Review of Economics and Finance is ranked #634 on the aggregate rankings list (AER is #2 behind QJE, JEEM is #44) and my faith in RePEc is restored. 

    So, while I am thrilled that they find our paper interesting, I don't think I'll submit a paper or serve as an honorary reviewer.  

    Update: embarrassing typos and poor grammar corrected.

  • Update on L.A.'s balls:

    The benefits are clear, Professor Pradhanang insists, as Los Angeles strives to retain as much water as possible amid the drought. Like other urban cities, such as New York, they also face a constant battle to keep wildlife off the clean water reservoirs, as their feces is the real source of bacteria.

    And, though the truck-load of balls cost $34.5 million, it is easily a much cheaper alternative to covering the site in tarps.

    But any color would have been better than black.

    'As we know, black absorbs heat. So that won't help the thermal blanket,' remarks Professor Pradhanang. 'The key is to keep these balls clean – but that will be a monumental task.' 

    via www.dailymail.co.uk

  • The sports stadium contingent valuation literature is getting saturated. It has become well known that, in most applications, the benefits, including hard to measure "intangibles" like civic pride, do not exceed the costs. However, that is when the payment vehicle is a tax:

    Emphasizing that a new venue to replace the 19-year-old Edward Jones Dome is an absolute necessity, St. Louis Rams owner Stan Kroenke revealed Monday that the team will be forced to relocate as soon as 2016 unless taxpayers build a new stadium with their bare hands. “We want to keep Rams football in St. Louis, but realistically, we can’t continue operating here unless the city’s taxpayers agree to lay a 1.3-million-square-foot concrete foundation and then construct the new stadium by hand,” said Kroenke, adding that his proposal for a state-of-the-art riverfront stadium would require at least 22 months of manual labor from each of the 320,000 residents living in St. Louis. “The facts are simple: The people of St. Louis must be prepared to personally erect the arena’s 14,000-ton steel structure, raise and paint the 30-story-tall stadium walls, screw in each of the 80,000 seats, and install a retractable roof—all while using only basic hand tools, which we would be willing to provide. Otherwise, we’ll have to consider the possibility of moving the Rams elsewhere.” At press time, sources confirmed that Kroenke’s proposal was unanimously approved by the St. Louis city council.

    via www.theonion.com

    This is intriguing. One could propose a willingness-to-work payment vehicle as a stadium subsidy. It is not unprecedented since it works well in developing country applications. While money is tight for most sports fans, what with the price of team jerseys and what not, they might have plenty of time available to do manual labor in support of their team. Right?